ABSTRACT. The attractive feature of the Everett approach is its admirable spirit of approaching the quantum puzzle with a Zen-like "beginner's mind" in order to try to envision what the pure formalism might be saying about quantum reality, even if that journey leads to a strange place. It is argued that the transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics (TI), appropriately interpreted, shares the same motivation and achieves much more, with far fewer conceptual perplexities, by taking into account heretofore overlooked features of the quantum formalism itself (i.e. advanced states). In particular, TI does not need to talk about brain states, consciousness, or observers (rational or otherwise). In its possibilist variant ("PTI"), it shares the realist virtues of treating state vector branches as genuine dynamical entities, without having to explain how or why all of their associated outcomes actually happen (they don't), how to account for a plenitude of counterpart observers in some coherent notion of trans-temporal identity of the bifurcating observers (observers don't bifurcate in TI), nor how the certainty of all outcomes could be consistent with any coherent theory of probability, let alone the Born probability (the Born probability emerges naturally in TI). In short, TI is precisely the one-world interpretation Kent is looking for in his (2010).
has recently provided a carefully considered and somewhat gloomy assessment of the prospects for successfully fulfilling the Everettian program. While he expresses optimism "that we can find simpler one-world versions of quantum theory that have all the aforementioned virtues ['a well defined Lorentz covariant physical ontology that adds little or no arbitrary structure to the mathematics of quantum theory and that reproduces all the scientific successes of Copenhagen quantum theory within its domain of validity'] and none of the problems that afflict, and I think ultimately doom, the Everett program," he goes on to suggest (somewhat ominously, in this author 's view) that "the failure of the Everett program adds to the likelihood that the fundamental problem is not our inability to interpret quantum theory correctly but rather a limitation of quantum theory itself." (2010, 2 (preprint version)) The primary aims of this paper are (1) to follow up on Kent's optimism concerning a simpler one-word interpretation and (2) to dispel the notion that quantum theory might need ad hoc "fixing" because we are having trouble understanding its message about reality. Concerning (2), the situation is not that desperate: we do have the resources to make sense out of quantum theory in its well-corroborated pure form. We just need to reconsider a perfectly viable interpretation (TI) which has received insufficient attention, probably due to the particular kind of conceptual challenge it represents (i.e., time symmetry). Yet if current researchers are willing to countenance such admittedly 'fantastic' (Kent's term) or speculative features as bifurcating worlds and observers, 'probability' redefined as not requiring uncertainty about outcome 1 , observer-dependent and ultimately subjective divisions of the world into 'system', 'observer', and 'environment', 2 the application of social philosophy and decision theory to subjectively defined 'rational' observers to try to derive purely physical laws such as 1 As Peter Lewis (2007) notes, "Greaves (2004, 426-427) suggests giving up the assumption that a subjective probability measure [the weights appearning in the set of possible outcomes] over future events requires uncertainty about what will happen, and Wallace (2006, 672-673) suggests giving up the assumption that uncertainty requires some fact about which one is uncertain". (1996, 2002) based on a "contingent absorber"-type thought experiment. In this experiment, one confirmation wave component for a slow-moving massive particle which is emitted in the form of offer waves (OW) in two possible directions (one to a near detector and one to a moveable farther detector behind it) would only be present if the nearby transaction failed, and the farther detector was then swung over to intercept the particle. Thus the farther detector's ability to return a CW was contingent on nondetection of the particle at the nearby detector. Maudlin then argued that the probability of detection based on this CW was only ½ , yet the particle was certain to be detected there, which seemed inconsistent; and also, that the "pseudotime" account given by Cramer (1986) could not provide a coherent account of the process.
However, Maudlin's objection has been answered by three different authors since then, all of them providing apparently reasonable ways for TI to remain viable in the face of this objection. Berkowitz (2002) argued that the Maudlin example constituted a causal loop, and argued that detection frequencies need not equal theoretical probabilities in the case of causal loops. Kastner (2006) argued that the Maudlin account argued against the original pseudotime account in Cramer (1986) but that this was merely a heuristic device
and not fundamentally constitutive of TI; and that the core of TI was that the probability of an outcome was given by the weight of the incipient transactions, an approach which can be given a perfectly coherent account in a "big space" account of probability.
5
Cramer (2005) resurrected his "pseudotime" approach by proposing that all we need in such cases is a hierarchy in which possible transactions with shorter spacetime intervals have ontological priority over those with longer spacetime intervals, so that the nearby incipient transaction's outcome would have to be decided "before" (in pseudotime) other transactions could enter the competition. While one might not necessarily fully endorse any one of these proposals, it seems clear that, in view of three different ways to counter the Maudlin argument, his 1996 summary pronouncement of TI's "collapse" was at least premature.
6 5 As defined in Placek and Butterfield (2002) , Section 3.3. 6 The present author is currently exploring yet another promising approach to address this type of "contingent absorber " objection based on dynamical properties of de Broglie waves.
In a recent paper (Kastner 2010) , the present author argued that the best way to understand TI is in terms of a (modal) realist view of offer and confirmation waves 7 . This approach, termed therein "possibilist TI" (PTI), takes what Everettians would call "branches" of the state vector as representing real dynamical possibilities whose collective structure is described by Hilbert space (or Fock space in the relativistic domain). Thus PTI already has much in common with the "Many Worlds" versions of Everett (MWI) which view branches of the state vector as real worlds in a "multiverse."
The crucial differences between PTI and MWI are that in PTI, (1) absorbers play an equal role with emitters via time-reversed influences, as discussed above and (2) state vectors are viewed as physically real possibilities (but not actualities as in MWI).
The remainder of this paper will further explicate feature (2) real, yet not actual (the only actualized outcome being the final detected result).
This application of possibilist realism to quantum theory has ample (but overlooked) precedent in Heisenberg's comment:
``The probability wave of Bohr, Kramers, Slater...was a quantitative version of the old concept of "potentia" in Aristotelian philosophy. It introduced something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality. (Heisenberg (2007) , p. 15)
Heisenberg never really pursued this bit of physical insight, but the PTI approach is to take his suggestion seriously: the state vector (an "offer wave" in TI) represents a kind of physical reality: that is, physically real possibilities "standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event" which can interact with each other and with physical potentials and give rise to an actualized event by "setting the stage" for possible transactions, through which energy and other conserved quantities are transferred. It is these pre-detection interactions on the level of possibility which provide the extra information responsible for quantum computing's power.
Here is another way to understand the power and efficacy of the "mere possibilities" represented by quantum states. Consider a hydrogen atom. The state vector of the electron can be seen as describing many possible positions (or momenta or some combination thereof) for the electron, but when no measurement is made on the electron-when it is not detected-its state can be considered a possibility wave "somewhere in the middle between possibility and actuality" in the sense described by Heisenberg above. In TI terms, it is an unabsorbed offer wave. Yet that "mere possibility" is incredibly powerful-powerful enough to support the structure of matter and to provide its apparent solidity. Note that in his (1998), Deutsch wants to describe such an electron as existing in all his many (interfering) worlds-being actualized in all possible different outcomes in each world. But since no observational basis has been specified, are these many worlds ones in which the electron has a definite (more precisely, narrowly localized) position, i.e. a splitting with respect to the position basis?
Or momentum? 9 How much simpler it is to just view the state vector as representing a real and potent (if not 'actual') entity sufficient in itself, uncommitted to any particular basis. Again, the point is that we don't need to posit actualized worlds corresponding to specific outcomes (and then have to worry about the ambiguity of basis for these outcomes) to get the job done, if we view possibilities-represented by state vectors--as having dynamic potency.
Admittedly, there is "collapse" in TI (or PTI). But note that the collapse is completely "defanged" compared to the usual notion of collapse. First, there is no need for an observer: collapse occurs anytime an emitter receives one or more CW in response to an OW. The new interpretational ingredient that "cuts the Gordian knot" of the apparent observer-dependence of quantum phenomena is the taking into account of the dynamical role of absorbers on an equal footing with emitters. Thus TI is an "observerfree collapse interpretation" in Bub's terms (1997) . In TI, collapse is not observerdependent but simply absorber-dependent.
Without including the role of the absorber, all we have is an offer wave (the "quantum state") that never gets a response, so it is typically considered to be propagating endlessly out into the world, continually being amplified depending on what it happens to encounter: a geiger counter; a cat; an observer; Wigner; Wigner's Friend;
Alice; Bob; etc; etc;. ad infinitum. Without taking absorbers into account, there is no principled way to call a halt to this proliferating, ever-amplifying quantum state. In the farthest extreme, we have the "universal state vector" unitarily propagating ever onward, so that (from a God's eye view), allegedly nothing ever "really" happens. Thus arises the necessity to consider arbitrary divisions of the universal state vector into "observer" 3. What is the "pure" theory and why does TI address it effectively?
In Everett's view and that of his followers, the "pure theory" is only the unitary evolution of the state vector, without the projection postulate. But an important part of the theory-the part that allows it to make empirical contact with experience-is the Born
Rule. Thus the "pure theory" should properly be considered to be the combination of linear evolution of the state vector with the Born Rule. The Born Rule cannot just be tacked on as an afterthought: it is a crucial component of the theory, just as a crucial part of electromagnetic theory is that the electrical (or magnetic) energy of the field is proportional to the square of the field. Nobody would try to interpret electromagnetic theory by initially ignoring the expression for electrical energy just because (hypothetically) it was not clear how that quantity was physically related to the field, and then trying to account for the energy after the fact by considering "FAPP"-type
explanations such as what a rational observer might expect to bet on when making decisions about electric field-based phenomena. The genuine interpretational challenge would be to understand how the electrical energy is physically related to the field. The same challenge applies to quantum theory: how is the probability for outcomes physically related to the state vector? Everettian approaches can give no answer in these terms, as
Kent's discussion makes clear.
So the pure theory properly consists of both the linear evolution of the state vector and the well-corroborated empirical link with experience, the Born Rule. We need a physical explanation for the Born Rule. TI provides a simple and elegant one: the Born Rule corresponds to the final amplitude of the CW at the locus of the emitter. Since it is the transaction based on that CW component which may, or may not, result in actualization of the corresponding outcome, we have a genuinely probabilistic situation:
an objectively uncertain result whose probability is precisely the amplitude of the CW at the emitter.
Conclusion: TI deserves serious and open-minded reconsideration.
It has been argued that there is in fact a perfectly viable one-world (one actual world, that is) interpretation that can potentially fulfill Kent's requirements for "a mathematically elegant, universally applicable, Lorentz invariant, scientifically adequate
[interpretation] of quantum theory that supplies a well-defined realist ontology." (Kent 2010, 2) . As noted in the Abstract, TI approaches the total formalism--the combination of the linear unitary evolution and the Born Rule--with a "Beginner's Mind" and tries to see what the formalism is really telling us. Clearly, the mathematics expresses a symmetry of retarded and advanced solutions, and truly "letting the formalism speak"
means not assuming that part of it (the advanced part) should be ignored because it doesn't fit our preconceptions about the "flow of time." Taking 
